I. Introduction
Since first embarking on the road of risk management options for the regulation of recombinant DNA (rDNA) activities and use in 1978, the European Union (EU) has largely failed to create a regulatory and policy environment regarding genetically modified (GM) crops and their cultivation that is (a) efficient, (b) predicable, (c) accountable, (d) durable or (e) interjurisdictionally aligned. Recent proposed regulatory changes announced by the European Union Commission (July 13, 2010) aim to allow member states to enact restrictive measures on cultivation of GM crops based on broadly scoped non-scientific criteria 1 . In light of the European Union Commission's proposal, this paper reviews the EU's past efforts to effectively regulate GM crops, critically assesses the impacts of the new regulatory proposals, and examines some of the key outstanding issues with the current EU regulatory framework that will need to be considered as the EU moves forward into its next phase of GM crop governance.
II. Historic review of the EU GM Crop regulatory framework
The EU has a long history in its regulatory approach to the technology of rDNA and its applications. Building on Galloux et al. ' s analysis 2 of the EU's public policies in the area of biotechnology five regulatory policy phases can be identified along the EU GM crop regulatory policy pathway, namely: 1. Non-legislation period (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) 2. Reorganisation period (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) 3. First legislation period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) 4. Second legislation period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) 5. Third legislation period (2001-to date)
1. Non-legislation period Regulation in the European Union pertaining to the use of rDNA stems from the early 1970s. In July 1974, resulting from the "Berg letter" published in Science 3 , the United Kingdom established a Committee (the Ashby Working Party) to advise on whether rDNA research should proceed within the UK. In December 1974, the Ashby Working party recommended that such research should continue, provided adequate safeguards were put in place (HMSO, 1974) . By reporting so promptly, the concepts developed by the Ashby Working Party were used by UK scientists and other European scientists during the February 1975 Asilomar conference in the USA. In 1978, the European Commission proposed a regulatory approach to research on rDNA that would have required statutory notification and authorisation by national authorities * The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the authors.
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. The proposed approach was later replaced by a non-binding Council Recommendation 8 . This recommendation, which was based on the US and UK's experiences regarding rDNA and the desire of the Commission to avoid fixed statutory controls, simply asked EU member states to adopt laws, regulations and administrative provisions requiring "notifications" as opposed to "authorizations" to carry out rDNA work 9 .
Reorganisation period (1983-1986)
In October 1983, a European Commission communication 10 addressed the concept of regulating biotechnology under the following three headings: -biological safety, -the consumer and the bio-industry, -the regulation of products and their free circulation. At that time there was a clear intention by the European Commission to attempt to "ensure regulatory provision to maintain rational standards".
In 1986, the OECD published its Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations booklet that is now known as the "The Blue Book"
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. This OECD document was one of the first attempts to harmonize biosafety principles. It contained guidelines for assessing the safety of large scale use of rDNA organisms. By the mid1980s several European member states introduced national biotechnology regulatory frameworks (e.g. Denmark was the first European country to adopt legislation specifically on rDNA, with its June 1986 Gene Technology Act).
At the end of 1983, Étienne Davingnon, then EU Commission Vice-President and the EU Commissioners for agriculture and internal markets, proposed the formation of a Biotechnology Steering Committee (BSC) to be chaired by the Director-General of DG XII (Science, Research and Development). This BSC was formally established in early 1984. In 1985, another new body, the Biotechnology Regulation Inter-service Committee (BRIC), was also formed. BRIC was chaired jointly by DG III (Internal Market) and DG XI (Environment). Key aims of BRIC were to ensure the coherence of scientific data which would form the basis of risk assessment, and moreover to avoid unnecessary duplication of testing between various sectors
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. One of the tasks completed by the BRIC was an inventory report of Member States' biotechnology regulations. While the report drawn up by BRIC highlighted the desire for a pan EU regulatory framework, it indicated that some states, particularly the U.K., France and the Netherlands, seemed inclined to view existing legislation as a basic requirement to which countries might add further requirements relevant to their particular situationgeographical, climatic or regional 13 .
First legislation period (1986-1991)
In 20 . Directive 90/219/ EEC dealt with the contained use of GM microorganisms, while Directive 90/220/EEC regulated the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment within the EU. Despite scientific advice to the contrary, both used the process of "genetic modification" as their regulatory trigger.
Second legislation period (1992-2001)
Directive 90/220/EEC never fully achieved its primary goal of regulatory harmonization across the EU. If compliance with rules is a key indicator of legitimacy, by the mid 1990's the EU's GMO regulatory framework was beginning to lose its legitimacy
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. Several member states had begun using the "safeguard" clauses in Directive 90/220/EEC to prevent the commercial release of certain GM products within their jurisdiction. Directive 90/220/EEC began to be seen as deeply inadequate, and eventually disintegrated during the infamous so called de facto moratorium on new authorizations of GM crops. Following declarations from twelve (of then fifteen) Member States that they were opposed to further authorisations of GMOs, the Commission halted the submission of GMOs through the authorisation process; hence a de facto moratorium was established 22 . During this legislation period no new GMO approvals were granted from April 1998 onwards. Clearly, failures within the regulatory policy system forced the EU into this de facto moratorium situation which stalled approvals of GM products (predominantly GM crops). This stalemate situation occurred due to differing ideas of risk, some clear cultural and historical differences between Member States, and also the continued rise of "biopolitics" as a key arbiter of science policy develop-
EU Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the contained
Use of genetically modified Microorganisms and Proposal for a Council Directive on the deliberate Release to the Environment of genetically modified Organisms, COM (88)160.
16 Minutes from the 40th meeting of the Council of the EMBO, 1st October 1988: "… any legislation should focus not on the technique but on the safety or otherwise of the products generated with it. ... Over the last 15 years, experience has shown that recombinant DNA methods, far from being inherently dangerous, are an important tool both for understanding properties of life and for developing applications valuable to humankind and the environment. EMBO strongly believes that there is no scientific justification for additional specific legislation regulating recombinant research per se. Any rules or legislation should only apply to the safety of products according to their properties, rather than according to the methods used to generate them". ment within the EU 23 . Thus under renewed political pressure and with a de facto moratorium in place, the EU once again returned to the legislative process to put in place a new Directive relating to GMOs.
In June 1999, the Council of Ministers met for a twenty-hour session in Luxembourg to consider the issue of GMOs. Before the meeting, European politics had become intensified because of the EU parliamentary elections taking place that same year. In addition, GM crops had become a hot topic in the public sphere due to the extensive media reporting of the infamous Arpad Pusztai rat feeding experiments 24 and experiments reporting possible effects of Bt pollen on Monarch butterflies 25 . In fact, during the EU Parliament election of 1999, GM crops were a topic that many MEP candidates reported to have confronted on the campaign trail. At the Council meeting in June, there was a French-sponsored declaration calling for a moratorium on all GMO approvals. With an absence of any legal authority to declare such a formal moratorium it became clear the French position was largely "biopolitical" posturing 26 . During the Council of Ministers meeting, it quickly became apparent that there were two substantially different declarations that embodied very separate approaches to the regulation of GMOs. The first statement asked the Commission to "... without delay draft rules ensuring labelling and traceability of GMOs and GMO derived products and state that, pending the adoption of such rules, in accordance with preventive and precautionary principles, they will take steps to have any new authorisations to allow for growing and placing on the market suspended". The member state signatories to this declaration included France, Greece, Italy, Denmark and Luxembourg. The second declaration requested that it would "... not authorise the placing on the market of any GMOs until it is demonstrated that there is no adverse effect on the environment and human health". This was signed by Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. A number of countries (Britain, Ireland, and Portugal) did not sign any of the above declarations. Eventually, the Environment Ministers agreed that there was no legal basis for a moratorium. They also agreed on proposals that included: -Post-marketing monitoring of GM crops; -New risk assessment rules; -Phasing out antibiotic marker gene use; -Formal bioethics studies; -Examination of the liability clause; and -Increased public input and information
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. While not yet completed, this exercise intends to cover the two major aspects of the current legislation: the risk assessment and regulatory approval process, and also the associated 42 Ricroch, Bergé and Kuntz, "Suspension of MON810", supra note 37.
43 European Food Safety Authority, "Scientific Opinion on Applications (EFSA-GMO-RX-MON810) for renewal of authorisation for the continued marketing of (1) existing food and food ingredients produced from genetically modified insect resistant maize MON810; (2) feed consisting of and/or containing maize MON810, including the use of seed for cultivation; and of (3) 
III. Preliminary regulatory impact assessment
While the EU Commission has not yet officially consulted stakeholders (e.g., scientists, industry, consumers, farmers groups etc) nor carried out a formal regulatory impact assessment on the proposed changes to the GM regulatory framework, a number of potential qualitative risks and benefits can be identified even at this early stage. Any assessment is currently only cursory in nature due to the limited information provided by the EU Commission in their proposal. Based on such scant information the proposed amendments may carry the following qualitative risks:
Market/economy risks
The market/economy risk relates to the generation of uncertainty and lack of policy coherence across the EU single market. The current proposals will likely result in an inefficient, unstable and fractured market for GM seeds in the EU based on a myriad of inter-jurisdictionally unaligned GM cultivation opt out criteria amongst different Member States. This can occur if Member States exercise their rights to apply different socio-economic aspects to their respective cultivation regulations that could shift and change over time.
Political risks
Those wanting to establish GM free Regions envisage such regions as free from both GM commercial cultivation and GM research field trials. However, the Commission's new proposals currently only cite/apply to commercial cultivation thus socio-economic reasons cannot be applied to field trials which are based on a Member State's competent authority's scientific risk assessment pertaining to environmental/ biosafety risks.
Legal risks
a. There is a risk that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) might be requested to determine the proportionality of the adopted regulation and it seems unlikely that absolute measures such as total bans on cultivation based on socio-economic grounds would pass the test of EU law conformity (see M.
Weimer in this issue). b. Member States may encounter conflicts between their obligations stemming from WTO law and the Cartagena Protocol depending on the criteria they apply in restricting GM crop cultivation (see S. Poli and M. Weimer in this issue). In addition, individual EU member states with their own sui generis approach to banning of cultivation on socio-economic grounds are quite likely to face bilateral legal challenges from other countries within the framework of the WTO that will be difficult to deflect due to the absence of common EU legislation on the specific issue of socio-economic grounds for banning GM crop cultivation.
Innovation/competiveness risks
a. A stable regulatory and policy environment is required for innovation to flourish. Considering the high turnover rate of Member States governments coupled with a current standard of considering socio-economic risks, national GM cultivation policies banning cultivation on socio-economic grounds will be highly susceptible to national political fluctuations thus impeding and preventing long term innovation strategies. This is likely to negatively impact on Lisbon Agenda goals of promotion of innovation and investment in EU member states. Such lack of stability could lead to incomplete research programs, cancelled EU funded projects, flight of capital and scientific knowledge from the EU, and employment uncertainty within the plant science research commu-nity making the EU a unattractive research and development location for the agri-food sector 48 . b. The precedent of establishing a non-harmonized socio-economic regulatory framework could form the basis for future regulatory policy in other emerging technology areas leading to ever increasing diversification across EU Member States in their regulatory responses to products of innovation. In effect, an a la carte approach to GM crop regulation across EU member states could precipitate a la carte approaches to many other areas and issues (e.g., nanotechnology, etc.) across the EU (on the basis for precedent having now been established). On the other hand, the proposed amendments may carry the following qualitative benefits:
Market/economy benefits
A socio-economic rationale for banning GM cultivation could offer slight savings in identity preservation costs to a small subsection of the market.
Political benefits
a. National and local political benefits could be realised by certain political groups that have had political goals to introduce GM cultivation bans. b. Political benefits could be accrued by the EU Commission in conceding on the issue of GM cultivation in return for more flexibility by Member States towards issues pertaining to GM food (increased tolerance thresholds for the presence of GM material) and GM feed (a non-zero threshold for the adventious low level presence of unapproved events). c. Potential reduction in the frequency of Member
States implementing health and environmental safeguard clauses on approved GM crops.
IV. Key outstanding issues with the current EU regulatory framework
While the EU Commission's current proposal yet again attempts to modify the European regulatory framework for GM crop cultivation, it leaves a number of key issues unresolved. These issues arise from the fact that the current EU regulatory framework regulates on the basis of the "process" that is used to create the traits in a new plant variety (i.e., singling out genetic modification from a whole host of modern plant biotechnology applications) rather than regulating the impacts of the new traits themselves. Firstly, as Directive 01/18 is based on the precautionary principle (PP), it is expected that the directive would follow the EU's own official guidance on the PP
49
. These guidelines state that the PP should be employed in a proportional, non-discriminatory and consistent manner to examine the benefits and costs of an action or lack thereof and the scientific developments pertaining to the risk in question. In particular, the principle of non-discrimination decrees that similar risks should not be treated differently 50 . The reference to "the nature of the production process" is notable because it contradicts the EU's current GM policies and regulatory frameworks that focus exclusively on "genetic modification" and ignores other non-GM plant biotechnology applications which have been shown to be possibly as risky an environmental and health risk perspective easures taken under the precautionary principle should be designed to achieve an equivalent level of protection without invoking the geographical origin or the nature of the production process to apply different treatments in an arbitrary manner", ibid 53 . Another example is the fact that the current process of the safety evaluation of GM versus conventionally bred plants is considered not well balanced and may not provide the best framework of adequate safety assessment 54 . These examples coupled with the evidence that the currently used "genetic modification" processes used to produce GM crops can have a lesser effect on the target genome or on gene expression than other breeding methods 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 or even different cultivation techniques 61 highlight systemic weaknesses in an EU regulatory framework that is intended to be based on the PP 62, 63 . Moreover, the current EU regulatory framework rarely, if ever, applies the PP to assess the long-term social, environmental and economic costs of inaction -such as not deploying and supporting a new technology, including GM crops. This may reflect the current lack of an effective evidence-based system to balance both the risks and benefits of applying new biotechnologies. A more effective regulatory mechanism -for instance, a regulatory impact assessment framework by which bodies such as the EFSA could be mandated to also assess the benefits of GM crops relative to the perceived or potential risks -could create a more balanced and transparent risk/benefit assessment system. Currently, the EU lacks such a balanced framework to assess comparative risks and benefits from different crop improvement technologies -conventional breeding, induced-mutagenesis breeding, genetic modification, and others -and different production systems -conventional, organic, biodynamic, etc.
Secondly, the current EU regulatory framework for GM crops is not likely to be sustainable in its current form on a long term basis, particularly given the rapid pace of advances in plant biotechnology. Such shortcomings of the EU's current process-based GM policy were highlighted in a report by the Netherlands' Commission on Genetic Modification (CO-GEM), which advises the Dutch government regarding potential risks of genetic modification to human health and the environment. The ; grafting of non-GM components on genetically modified rootstock 73, 74, 75 and cis-genesis 76, 77 . In 2008 the EU Commission informed the EU Parliament (via a response to a parliamentary question) that a specific working group of external experts had been created to determine which of the newly developed plant breeding techniques would result in being captured by or excluded from EU regulations 78 . To effectively deal with above issues it is clear that the EU at some point will likely have to make the transition from a purely "process" based regulatory framework to a "product" based framework. This would allow a refocus of the risk assessment criteria to both better meet the current EU guidelines on the PP and to make the regulatory framework more sustainable in the face of ever advancing plant biotechnologies. Recent recommendations to the EFSA regarding the challenges and approaches for risk assessment regarding GM plants clearly highlight the fact that it defies scientific evidence to focus only on GM technology 79 .
V. Conclusions
The history of the development of EU regulations pertaining to plant biotechnology and specifically genetic modification of plants, supports the observation that science and policy making are two arenas that are not cognitively and culturally distinct but rather engaged in processes of constant exchange and mutual stabilization 80 . Notwithstanding the complex relationship that exists at the science/policy interface, four key considerations are considered critical in regards to the development of good regulatory oversight models pertaining to emerging technologies: (1) public confidence and trust in the utility and relevance of a technology and its regulatory oversight; (2) regulations should avoid discriminating against particular technologies unless there is a scientifically-based rationale for such disparate treatment; (3) regulatory systems need to be more flexible and adaptive to rapidly-changing technologies; (4) ethical and social concerns of the public about emerging technologies that are based on evidence and not scientifically unfounded narratives need to be expressly acknowledged and addressed in regulatory oversight
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. However, the current wording of the EU Commission's proposed new changes to Europe's GM crop regulatory framework do not satisfy any of Marchant et al.'s regulatory considerations outlined above. Thus, a more appropriate regulatory framework, better reflecting the ideals of the Precautionary Principle and regulatory sustainability, would focus on comparatively assessing the potential environmental, health and socio-economic risks versus the benefits of a product (e.g., a novel crop phenotype or characteristic), rather than simply overly focusing on (often hypothetical) risks of a very specific and narrow process (such as "genetic modification" as defined in EU legislation) through which a new plant variety was created.
Such an approach would also have "biopolitical" benefits of allowing decision makers greater scope and flexibility to frame and communicate risk mitigation options pertaining to products derived from an ever growing range of plant biotechnologies in terms of comparative risk and benefits of the plant trait in question rather than the process by which the trait was produced. This would provide the EU with the option to escape the regulatory roundabout it currently finds itself on regarding GM crops and successfully complete its journey on the road to resolution via the development of more rational risk mitigation measures that can effectively assess both risks and benefits.
